[7] Frame states that for this theory to be plausible, the entire bridge crew had to lose the tactical picture at the same time, which he considered to be too improbable. The negative perceptions of the RAN and their longevity were compounded by the handling of the collision. Frame, T., 1992, Where Fate Calls: the HMAS Voyager tragedy, Hodder & Stoughton, Sydney. Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc. On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres off Jervis Bay, when Voyager sailed under Melbourne's bow. "HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager: The Continuing Psychiatric Aftermath". HMAS Sydney II and the HSK Kormoran Shipwreck Sites, Admiralty House, Garden and Fortifications, Royal Australian Naval Transmitting Station ACT, Heritage Tour of Northern End of Garden Island, Naval Engagements, Operations and Capabilities, First Victory, Musical Composition by Petty Officer Musician Martyn Hancock. In regard to ship-to-ship communications, speculation that the collision may have been caused by misinterpreted signals resulted in the confirmation of ambiguous signals being encouraged (Frame 1992). Quick challenges were made mandatory if a ship’s course was not understood or caused concern (Oxenbould 2004). Life on the Line tracks down Australian war veterans and records their stories. Escorting the Melbourne was considered a death sentence by those who were superstitious. Hall, T., 1982, HMAS Melbourne, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. When flying operations were being carried out in the Jervis Bay area by Albatross or HMAS Melbourne, it remained operationally ready until Albatross reported that fixed wing air operations had ceased for the day. From Australia to U.S.A. Destination, rates & speeds. Whilst the exact cause of the collision has never been determined, it is clear there were multiple failings on one or both bridges. [6] During a series of manoeuvres beginning at 8:40 pm, which were intended to reverse the courses of both ships onto a northward heading of 020°, Voyager ended up to starboard of Melbourne. Long shot of the Evans cut in two. For the American families of the men lost, it is a time of absolute grief and anguish. [66] Some cases had been open for more than ten years, costing the government millions of dollars a year in legal costs. [64] Procedures for challenging a ship that was manoeuvring dangerously or had transmitted an unclear manoeuvring signal were created. [63] Ferry's theory eliminates the need for a double error in the communications signals, and the need for all on the destroyer's bridge to have such a vastly incorrect assumption of where Voyager was in relation to the carrier. Ferry, D., 2014, HMAS Melbourne/Voyager collision: cause theories and inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision), Headmark, 151, p 2-16. Secondly the handling of the incident affects public perception. Erst 1955 wurde die Melbourne bei der australischen Marine in Dienst gestellt, wo sie bis 1982 im Einsatz blieb. Mr Justice George Lucas as presiding Commissioners investigating the claims made by Cabban. Independent trials and tests are also conducted before operational workups to assess basic drills and safety procedures (Oxenbould 2004). Three Sea Venom fighters are spotted aft of the island. In addition to procedural changes, the collision eventually forced the somewhat-reluctant RAN through positive cultural change (Chapman 1979). Furthermore, some escape hatches on Voyagerfailed to open and lifejackets were not readily available (Chapman 1979). Imagery is available on the Australian Defence Image Library at http://images.defence.gov.au/S20141580. 82 of the 314 ships company died as a result. [62] He claims that the destroyer knew where she was in relation to Melbourne and that the turn to starboard then reversal to port was intended to be a "fishtail" maneuver. [30] Robertson was marked for transfer to HMAS Watson, a training base in Sydney, and the admirals of the RAN decided to prevent Robertson from serving on Melbourne or any other seagoing vessel in the future. During the day of 10 February the ships operated independently, or exercised with the British submarine HMS Tabard. [39] It was argued that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness, drunkenness, or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events. The RAN officers lacked knowledge of the process, deferred to rank and honour while failing to raise key points and were often naïve in the face of a hostile investigation (Hall 1982). Furthermore, rigid regulations for operating with Melbourne were released (Hall 1982). Sie wurde in Großbritannien als Typschiff der Majestic-Klasse, einer Unterklasse der Colossus-Klasse, ab 1943 für die Royal Navy gebaut, der Bau wurde zu Kriegsende aber unterbrochen. Faith in the RAN’s competency is lessened when serious incidents occur. There was a lack of formal qualifications for an OOW on given platforms and different evolutions, and no measure of their experience, platform training and currency (Ferry 2014). Consequently, RAN officers were very familiar with naval practices but less so with civilian procedures. Life on the Line Podcasts [9], Animation showing the courses and positions of the two ships leading up to the collision, At 8:55 pm, with Voyager still turning to port, Melbourne's Navigation Officer ordered the carrier's engines to half speed astern, which Captain Robertson increased to full astern a few seconds later. This has widespread implications up to the international level; a finding of negligence would impact standing with allied naval forces. [31] Robertson submitted his resignation from the Navy on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting. Eighty-two people died when the destroyer HMAS Voyager was sliced in half by the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1964. "The Era of Forward Defence". Replaced by HMAS Duchess D154 (ex Royal Navy) after a famous collision with HMAS Melbourne on the 10th of February 1964. At the time John Robertson was the most senior Australian naval officer at sea with 35 years service. [17] Once offloaded, the two SAR boats rejoined the search effort: although all survivors were located within fifteen minutes and rescued, searches continued until well into 11 February. After the collision, Hagerty says, he was was taken to Sydney’s naval base HMAS Watson and cowed into silence by its captain, British officer Capt Ian Easton, also on secondment. On that night, Captain Stevens aboard Voyager was the only “old hand” on either Command Team (Frame 1992). On this day in 1964, the Royal Australian Navy aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne (II) collided with the Navy's Daring Class Destroyer, HMAS Voyager (II), off Jervis Bay, killing 81 sailors and one civilian dockyard worker. Furthermore, alterations to workups ensure they are of structured to progressively build up; close-quarters night flying exercises would not occur on directly after a long refit with new command teams (Oxenbould 2004). This damage comes from various sources. [4], HMAS Voyager was the first of three Australian-built Daring class destroyers. Quantity available: 1. [11] Voyager’s forward boiler exploded, briefly starting a fire in the open bow of the carrier before it was extinguished by seawater. "What caused the Voyager collision? On 26 October 2019, Melbourne was decommissioned from the RAN, subsequently being transferred to Chile. Spicer, J., 1964, Report of Royal Commissioner on loss of HMAS Voyager: Melbourne, 13th August 1964, Commonwealth Government Publisher, Canberra. It also highlighted numerous deficiencies, particularly those occurring on the ship’s bridge, and forced critical review and improvement. [60] Ferry is also of the opinion that, unless Melbourne was both in Voyager's radar blind spot and obscured by exhaust from the destroyer, it was unlikely that the bridge crew would think they were not to starboard of the carrier. Finally, the RAN is judged on the manner in which it treats individuals involved. This cine film has been placed online as part of the Sea Power Centre - Australia’s ongoing archival digitisation program. 1. Even prior to the collision, the RAN was under increasing public and parliamentary scrutiny (Frame 1992). 367–73. [23] Regulations for such an externally supervised inquiry were supposed to have been drafted following an explosion aboard HMAS Tarakan in 1950, but were never enacted, and Menzies' only option was to call for a Royal Commission. This is a "Family Friendly", open Group, and comments can be read by anyone on Facebook. Two Royal Commissions were held to investigate the incident. The Captain did not lose responsibility, but was more accountable and supporting members were empowered. [17] Another 36 were collected by Air Sprite and transported ashore. Melbourne was the only British Commonwealth naval vessel to sink two friendly warships in peacetime collisions. The consequential falls in recruiting demonstrated the lack of faith in the RAN (Frame 1992). The collision heavily damaged trust in the RAN and its standing with the Government and Australian public. In addition, Frame (1992) states the RAN was under pressure to prove herself to the two major allies, the Royal Navy and United States Navy. [6][7] 020° was the intended heading for flight operations, and at 8:52 pm, Voyager was ordered to resume the plane guard station. Ships conducting similar evolutions were also to be assisted from their Operations Room, something that did not occur on the night (Ferry 2014). The bow of HMAS Melbourne after the collision with HMAS Voyager. (1982). The second Royal Commission was driven by parliamentary backbench campaigning against a reluctant Government and Naval Board (McCarthy 2015). When Melbourne and Voyager collided, both bridges were manned by their respective Captains, navigators, OOW and various lookouts. For the second time in less than 5-1/2 years HMAS MELBOURNE [II] emerges from a collision, not of her making, but with her bows gashed, scraped and mangled. Tension also arose from the treatment of members during the investigations, particularly the Melbourne Command Team. Such exercises would be practiced in the daylight hours initially after graduation from simpler manoeuvres; from this perspective the Melbourne-Voyagerexercise program has little apparent preparation and seems overly ambitious. [1] She was laid down for the Royal Navy on 15 April 1943 at Vickers-Armstrongs' Naval Construction Yard in Barrow-in-Furness, England, and launched on 28 February 1945. Voyager and Melbourne were both sent to Jervis Bay for post-refit trials, with the two ships arriving on 9 February. Oxenbould, C., 2004, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager: What Happened?, The Sydney Papers, 16 (2), p 103-110. Daring Class Destroyer. A range of measures were introduced after the collision to address the deficiencies that became evident. [66] The last case was closed in July 2009.[69]. On the evening of 10 February 1964, the Melbourne and the Australian destroyer HMAS Voyager were performing manoeuvres off Jervis Bay, New South Wales. [19] She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1985. [66] A further 50 cases were closed in 2007 following mediation. The lack of accountability and action by the RAN disgusted Parliament and the public. HMAS Melbourne II - the Aussie Aircraft Carrier R-21 has 4,020 members. [49], Naval historian and ex-RAN officer Tom Frame, who studied the collision for his doctoral thesis, believes that the main cause of the collision was an error in communications: specifically that the instruction to turn to 020° then assume the plane guard station was garbled on receipt by Voyager. [1][2] Work was suspended at the end of World War II, and did not resume until the Australian government purchased her and sister ship HMAS Sydney in 1947. It also reviews improvements to Officer of the Watch (OOW) standards, Command Team training and operational procedures. Beschreibung: Aerial starboard side view of the Royal Australian Navy aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (R21) and the destroyers HMAS Vendetta (D08) and HMAS Voyager (D04) underway, circa in 1959. Prior to the collision, the RAN was relatively isolated and self-contained; this led to a glaring cultural clash during the Royal Commissions (Frame 2005). [15], At 9:58 pm, Melbourne was informed that five minesweepers (HMA Ships Snipe, Teal, Hawk, Ibis, and Curlew), two search-and-rescue (SAR) boats from HMAS Creswell (Air Nymph and Air Sprite), and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been dispatched. 103–10. Hobbs, Commander David (October 2007). [5] That evening, while 20 miles SE of Jervis Bay, Melbourne was performing night flying exercises, while Voyager was acting as the carrier's plane guard escort. [43], Following the events, changes were made within the RAN to prevent a similar event occurring. [5] The first all-welded ship built in Australia, Voyager was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957. Note: This video is hosted on YouTube and has no audio. It highlights the unsuitability of a Commission as means of investigation and lack of naval knowledge held by the civilian investigators (Frame 1992, Ferry 2014). Frame, T., 2005, The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW. [40] The hearings lasted 85 days, and the Burbury Report was released publicly on 25 February 1968. [25] This commission was directed primarily to investigate the immediate causes of the collision, and the circumstances which led up to it. HMAS Melbourne (FFG 05) was an Adelaide-class guided-missile frigate of the Royal Australian Navy, which entered service in 1992. The RAN was compromising between several constraints and aims. The destroyer was cut in half and sank; of a company of three hundred and fourteen, eighty two men were killed (Spicer 1964). USN Sea King lands on Melbourne's flight deck. [29] When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and those aboard her to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, as they did not alert Voyager to the danger she was in, and appeared to not take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding. [14], Melbourne returned to Sydney with the survivors, and was docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs to her bow,[19] which were completed by May 1964. [64][65], Families of those killed in the sinking of Voyager attempted to claim compensation for their losses, while survivors tried to make claims for post-traumatic stress and similar ailments. Inherited traditions shaped the culture and young adolescent officers were indoctrinated into the naval way of thinking and acting during their four year education at the Royal Australian Naval College. A key factor is what errors, failings or lack of knowledge may have led to the event. McCarthy, E., 2015, John Jess, Seeker of Justice: the Role of Parliament in the HMAS Voyager Tragedy, Sid Harta Publishers, Victoria. Mr Justice Kenneth Asprey, and The Hon. Whilst rising tensions in Indonesia had resulted in some investment, it was also forcing ships through rapid work–up exercises such as those Melbourneand Voyagerwere engaged in (Frame 1992). Department of Defence users will not be able to view this video on the Defence Protected Network. In building these connections, the RAN became a more open and transparent organisation with greater public and parliamentary accountability. That one RAN ship could effectively slice another in half with such a loss of life in home waters during peacetime was shocking (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1992). [52][54] Former RAN Commodore David Ferry disagrees with Frame's conclusions, claiming that the coincidence of two errors in the same signal was unlikely, and that either error would be sufficient cause for Stevens or the other officers to query the signal. This view was compounded by Captain Robertson’s resignation and Hall (1982) describes the tension caused within the mid-officer ranks. The service was balancing multiple goals, struggling to define its organisation and role in post-war Australia and had suffered multiple serious incidents. Hence, while the primary cause can only be speculated on, the collision had clear implications for the standards of the OOW and Command Team training and preparation. [3] The carrier was commissioned into the RAN on 28 October 1955. Melbourne was the only British Commonwealth naval vessel to sink two friendly warships in peacetime collisions.. HMAS Melbourne had been involved in a similar coliision in 1964. While the RAN expected a Naval Board of Inquiry, public and parliamentary mistrust, frustration at the information flow and the need for an impartial review resulted in a Royal Commission being convened (Frame 1992). 24 August 1921 – 29 January 2019 (Captain John Stevenson was captain of HMAS Melbourne at the time of the collision with the USS Frank E Evans in May 1969 in the South China Sea.) On the carrier's flight deck, two Gannet anti submarine aircraft are spotted forward with another to port abreast the island. [46] This was a legal drug at the time and was carried in RAN ships' medical lockers. [20], Following the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America offered to loan ships to the RAN as a replacement; the Royal Navy offering Daring class destroyer HMS Duchess, while the United States Navy offered two Fletcher class destroyers: USS The Sullivans and USS Twining. [5] During the day of 10 February the ships operated independently, or exercised with the British submarine HMS Tabard. [26] The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964. Only then would the duty SAR crew stand down until the following day. Whilst the collision itself is one of the service’s most damaging events, it and the resulting alterations laid the foundations for many practices of the modern RAN. Voyager was to swing out wide of the carrier, then turn back towards her, cross the stern and assume her position without having to do a loop. Both investigations were drawn out, controversial and a source of additional pain (Frame 2005). These reforms eventually led to the RAN becoming a more open and accountable organisation. Following any major change in Command Team, such drills are conducted before a ship goes to sea to ensure cohesion, competency and efficiency on the bridge (Oxenbould 2004). [8] The procedure to accomplish this required Voyager to turn away from Melbourne in a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then advance along Melbourne's port side. Where did the investigation fail?". Please Login to add a comment! It is the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held for a single incident. Operating from 1955 until 1982, she was the third and final conventional aircraft carrier(I) to serve in the RAN. [17][18], From the 314 personnel aboard Voyager at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and 1 civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but one of the bridge crew. Similarly, Captains were under more stringent medical reviews (Frame 1992). [1], The carrier was 701 feet 5 inches (213.79 m) long, had a displacement of 15,740 tons, and could reach a speed of 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph). The harshest scrutiny, however, arose from a series of escalating incidents and the associated fatalities (Frame 2005). This culminated in 1963 with the drowning of five junior officers who were sent on a twelve hour, out–of–sight sailing exercise in dubious weather (Frame 1992). pp. [9] At the same time, Stevens gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Cooper, Alastair (2001). [1] The carrier's air group consisted of de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine strike aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters. [33], Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians of the Government and Opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as claims made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, the former executive officer of Voyager, that Captain Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command. HMAS Melbourne after the collision. Objective platform qualification and periodic retesting combined with the use of advancing technology in the Bridge Simulator have greatly improved OOW training (Oxenbould 2004). It also contentiously held Melbourne’s Command Team partially responsible for failing to prevent the collision, leading to the Captain’s resignation (Spicer 1964). The RAN swimming standards were raised in response and escape and rescue procedures strengthened and practised (Ferry 2014). Turns … Filed Under: RAN operations, Article topics, Naval Engagements, Operations and Capabilities Tagged With: Collision, training, Australian Naval History Podcasts Gary was 18 and had recently marked two years' service when the collision happened at 3.15am on June 3, 1969, in the South China Sea. She was laid down for the Royal Navy on 15 April 1943, but construction was stopped at the end of World War II. "The Sinking of HMAS Voyager: What Happened?". HMAS Melbourne (R21) was a Majestic-class light aircraft carrier of the Royal Australian Navy. [5], Voyager and Melbourne were both sent to Jervis Bay for post-refit trials, with the two ships arriving on 9 February. pp. The Loss of HMAS Armidale by Dr Kevin Smith, D-Day commando on Sword Beach by Commander Jim Speed DSC, RAN. Occurring off the New South Wales coast in 1964, the aircraft carrier Melbourne and destroyer Voyager were engaged in night flying exercises when Voyager inexplicably turned in front of Melbourne’s bow. [12] The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until just after midnight. What is believed to be Australia's longest-running personal injury battle has come to an end, with a settlement in a claim arising from the collision between two Australian Navy ships 45 year ago. USS Frank E Evans after the collision with HMAS Melbourne (II) on 3 June 1969. This was only one aspect of the significant cultural change the RAN underwent. Safety, constant improvement and professional discipline became key goals. Finally, questions were being raised in Australia about the role and relevance of the RAN. Into this environment, the Melbourne–Voyager collision stunned Australia and further damaged the failing reputation of the RAN. [28] In it, Spicer concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of Voyager's bridge crew, in that they neglected to maintain an effective lookout and lost awareness of the carrier's location, although he did not blame individual officers. Whereas previously a Captain was rarely questioned and had almost autonomous power, all members of the bridge were encouraged to raise any concerns (Ferry 2014). The collision and its aftermath is of massive significance to the RAN and eventually led to large training, operational and cultural changes. [1][3] Melbourne underwent her annual refit from 16 September 1963 to 20 January 1964, with command handed over to Captain John Robertson in early January. an equipment failure occurred aboard one or both ships. AE1 – The Ship without a Name, Musical Composition by Lieutenant Matthew Klohs RAN. [8] It was initially assumed by Melbourne’s bridge crew that Voyager was "fishtailing", conducting a series of zig-zag turns in order to shed momentum before swinging behind Melbourne, but Voyager did not alter course again. Photographer unknown. Trust in the organisation and its self–management was quickly eroding. [5], At 390 feet (120 m) in length, Voyager displaced 2,800 tons (standard), and had a maximum speed of 34.75 knots (64.36 km/h; 39.99 mph). [38], A post-mortem conducted on Stevens' body showed a blood alcohol level of 0.025%, though the significance of this figure was challenged by expert witnesses. The collision of HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager remains the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) worst peacetime disaster. , wo sie bis 1982 im Einsatz blieb on that night, Captain Stevens aboard Voyager was the only old! Was compromising between several constraints and aims widespread implications up to the international level ; a finding negligence... 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